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Abstract. Conceptual engineers endeavor to improve our stock of concepts. But their endeavors 
face serious practical difficulties. One such difficulty – rational conceptual conflict - concerns the 
degree to which agents are incentivized to impede the efforts of conceptual engineers, especially 
in many of the contexts within which conceptual engineering is viewed as a worthwhile pursuit. 
Under such conditions, the already difficult task of conceptual engineering becomes even more 
difficult. Consequently, if they want to increase their chances of success, conceptual engineers 
should pay closer attention to – and devise strategies to mitigate – rational conceptual conflict. 
After outlining the phenomenon at greater length and mapping its connections to other similar 
practical problems (Section 1), I explore the dynamics of such conflict by way of several detailed 
case studies (Section 2). In particular, I focus on cases driven by material, social, and moral 
incentives. I then consider some important methodological implications of rational conceptual 
conflict (Section 3). Among other things, I argue that conceptual engineers should focus more 
heavily on cultivating settings that modify the payoffs and penalties associated with conceptual 
conflict. By such indirect means, they can incentivize conceptual cooperation rather than conflict, 
thus making it easier to achieve success in conceptual engineering. Section 4 concludes. 
 







Conceptual engineers are in the business of assessing and evaluating concepts. If necessary, they 
attempt to repair, replace, or even abandon them. Naturally, such attempts raise important practical 
difficulties. One understudied and underappreciated practical problem facing conceptual engineers 
is the degree to which conceptual conflict can be rational. Conceptual conflict occurs when an 
agent (or group of agents) deliberately attempts to block or otherwise impede the conceptual 
engineering efforts of others. Importantly, we’ll see that our lives are often structured such that the 
initiation or continuation of conceptual conflict become appropriate means to our chosen ends. 
Under conditions where conceptual conflict is incentivized, the already difficult task of 
engineering concepts becomes considerably more difficult. Accordingly, to increase the chances 
that their projects succeed, conceptual engineers ought to pay closer attention to – and, if possible, 
devise strategies to mitigate - problems created by rational conceptual conflict. 
 In Section 1 I outline the problem posed by rational conceptual conflict at greater length, 
as well as discussing its relationship to other already recognized practical impediments to 
successful conceptual engineering. I argue both that the sort of incentives which drive conceptual 
conflict are quite common and that even forms of conceptual engineering where success is 
seemingly easiest to achieve will often face difficulties which we should not underestimate.  
In Section 2 I explore the dynamics of rational conceptual conflict. While idealized 
descriptions of conceptual engineering tend to focus on the degree to which it is driven by 
paradigmatically philosophical considerations (such as whether a concept satisfies certain 
theoretical desiderata), much ordinary conceptual conflict is driven by the pursuit of things like 
wealth, power, and social status, desire for which can often override more distinctively 
philosophical aims. Accordingly, I discuss several examples of rational conceptual conflict driven 
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by the pursuit of material benefits, social benefits, and by underlying moral commitments. Though 
the details differ from case to case, each involves agents attempting to secure benefits and avoid 
costs by instigating conceptual conflict.  
In Section 3 I discuss some important methodological implications of rational conceptual 
conflict. Negatively, the possibility of such conflict sometimes militates entirely against attempting 
to engineer a concept. Sometimes conceptual conflict simply makes it impossible for us to 
successfully engineer concepts. Other times, while not rendering success impossible, conflict 
brings expected costs which outweigh the expected benefits of success in conceptual engineering. 
Positively, the recognition that conceptual conflict is often driven by incentives allows conceptual 
engineers to more readily develop effective strategies to mitigate it. Rather than focusing on 
potentially fruitless strategies that ignore the underlying incentives, I suggest that conceptual 
engineers should focus more heavily on cultivating settings that modify the payoffs and penalties 
associated with conceptual conflict. By such indirect means we can disincentivize conceptual 
conflict while at the same time incentivizing greater levels of conceptual cooperation. Section 4 
concludes.  
 
1. The Problem of Rational Conceptual Conflict 
At its most general, conceptual engineering is the “critical/constructive enterprise of assessing and 
improving our representational devices” (Cappelen, 2018: 3). Our representational devices – 
henceforth concepts - can be defective, and so we should try to repair them whenever possible.1 
 
1 There are several competing theories regarding the nature of concepts and what it is to engineer them. Indeed, on 
some accounts it is a misnomer to say it is concepts we engineer and not, say, word-meanings. Setting such disputes 
aside in this paper, I assume that my claims regarding rational conceptual conflict apply to all extant theories of 
conceptual engineering, writing of concepts only for convenience. For more on competing theories of conceptual 
engineering, see Cappelen (2018: 163-99). 
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When we endorse some strategy about how best (or whether) to repair a defective concept, let’s 
say that we endorse an ameliorative proposal (Haslanger, 2012). In the same vein, let’s call 
concrete efforts to engineer concepts ameliorative projects.2 
The details of any given ameliorative project will vary from case to case, with some calling 
for ‘mere’ conceptual revision, others requiring complete conceptual abandonment, and so on. 
Similarly, ameliorative projects vary in scale. In some cases, conceptual engineers will be satisfied 
once a relatively small community of concept-users adopts the ameliorative proposal, while in 
others much larger numbers will be involved. Crucially, though, it is important to recognize that 
advancing an ameliorative proposal, no matter its motivation or intended scope, is just the first 
step towards engineering some concept. Conceptual engineers also need to be able to implement 
their preferred proposals – that is, they need to develop feasible ameliorative projects whereby 
their ameliorative ambitions are achieved. This immediately raises pressing practical problems for 
conceptual engineers. In addition to the identification and categorization of defective concepts, 
they need to develop ways to successfully carry out their projects; and to best carry out their 
projects, they must understand the sorts of practical problems they’re likely to encounter. Call this 
the Implementation Problem (Cappelen, 2020; Jorem, forthcoming).  
 Some barriers to successful implementation have already been recognized in the literature 
on conceptual engineering. For instance, the success of certain ameliorative projects crucially 
depends upon the ability of people to reason competently with newly engineered concepts. 
However, people will vary in their ability to understand and use new concepts (Fischer, 2020). 
When too many people are unable to understand the relevant proposals, ameliorative projects 
 
2 ‘Ameliorative’ here should be read as elliptically referring to the values and goals of the agent endorsing the 
ameliorative proposal and project. People will naturally disagree over whether any given proposal is one that will 
improve the concept in question. In other words, they will often disagree about which proposals are truly ameliorative. 
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might fail. For another, if metasemantic externalism is true, then facts about the history of a 
concept, facts about how a concept is currently used, facts about how experts use a concept, and 
facts about the environment are all relevant to determining the meaning of a concept. Since we 
lack control over such facts, conceptual engineering will be extremely difficult (Cappelen, 2018: 
72-4). 
 The practical problem outlined in this paper - rational conceptual conflict - shares more in 
common with the latter than the former. Broadly speaking, conceptual conflict occurs when an 
agent (or group of agents) deliberately attempts to impede the ameliorative projects of another 
agent (or group of agents). Importantly, these attempts are often instrumentally rational. Given an 
agent’s beliefs and preferences, initiating or perpetuating conceptual conflict become appropriate 
means to chosen ends. Under such conditions, conceptual conflict is incentivized. When this 
occurs, the successful implementation of ameliorative projects becomes considerably more 
difficult.  
In a sense, existing worries about lack of control, while not false, underdescribe the 
practical hurdles facing conceptual engineers. To be sure, we can’t easily control the relevant 
metasemantic facts. But just as important is the fact that we can’t easily control the behavior of 
other agents, some of whom will have good reason to oppose our ameliorative projects.3 To the 
extent that ameliorative projects require the coordination of potentially large numbers of agents, 
then, we will in many cases face a serious practical problem. Instead of coordination, we’ll 
encounter conflict, brought about by the purposive action of agents rationally responding to 
incentives.   
 
3 Of course, we lack control over agents who oppose us regardless of whether metasemantic externalism is true. 
Accordingly, claims about the extent to which internalist metasemantic theories render conceptual engineering much 
simpler – as in Burgess & Plunkett (2013) - are overstated.   
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 We can think of the relationship between incentives and conceptual conflict in the 
following schematic way. Roughly, there are two main ways in which conceptual conflict becomes 
rational. According to the first, agents with conflicting preferences and/or beliefs clash over the 
expected downstream effects of successfully implementing an ameliorative proposal. When agents 
have conflicting preferences about the desirability of these downstream effects, conceptual conflict 
becomes incentivized as a means to secure their preferred outcome, whether a maintenance of the 
status quo or the implementation of an opposing ameliorative proposal with different expected 
downstream effects.4 According to the second, an agent (or group of agents) might be able to 
secure benefits from initiating conceptual conflict. Simply by initiating conflict, such agents can 
secure benefits, even if no benefits come from the downstream effects of securing one ameliorative 
proposal over another.  
Naturally, cases of rational conceptual conflict involving more complex mixed motivations 
are possible. Within the same conflict, some agents might be motivated by the prospective gain 
rendered likely by implementing their preferred ameliorative proposal, while others might initiate 
conflict simply because the conflict itself yields rewards. In some cases, there may be benefits both 
to securing a preferred ameliorative proposal and to initiating the conflict itself. Regardless of the 
underlying motivations, however, rational conceptual conflict plausibly presents a problem for the 
implementation of ameliorative proposals.  
 However, one might be skeptical of the severity of the problem posed by rational 
conceptual conflict. A preliminary worry concerns the degree to which this description of 
conceptual engineering and conceptual conflict over-intellectualizes typical concept-involving 
 
4 We can make a further distinction between cases where the relevant agents (dis)value the downstream effects non-
instrumentally and cases where the relevant agents (dis)value the downstream effects instrumentally (i.e., to secure 
some independently valued end).  
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behavior.5 How we acquire and subsequently use concepts, one might think, does not depend on 
overt intentions to acquire and use concepts, in much the same way that linguistic conventions can 
arise as solutions to recurrent coordination problems without any deliberate attempts to create and 
sustain such conventions (Lewis, 1969). Similarly, conceptual change that arises as the aggregate 
result of repeated interaction among groups of agents is not something any agent intends. 
Conceptual change, while an outcome of human action, is not a product of human design (Keller, 
1994). Purposive action involving underlying motivations (and thus incentives) doesn’t feature in 
such processes. Why think, then, that conceptual engineers will face resistance from agents with 
explicit intentions to impede their efforts?  
 However, while we should avoid over-intellectualizing such behavior, we should also 
avoid under-intellectualizing it. We can occasionally step back and reflect on our concepts, 
assaying their overall quality, even if most of these concepts have developed and been acquired as 
a result of largely unreflective processes. Concept-involving behavior is no different to other forms 
of behavior insofar as it can fall along a spectrum ranging from the unreflective and more-or-less 
automatic to the deliberate, intentional, reflective, strategic, and so forth. Walking, for instance, is 
typically automatic. But sometimes, as when we traverse rough terrain, we pay attention to where 
and how we walk. Sometimes we even walk in unison, engaging in deliberate forms of collective 
action such as marching or protesting. So it goes with concept-involving behavior: sometimes it is 
entirely automatic, but sometimes we engage in higher-order thought about which concepts to use 
(and how to use them), attempt to identify conceptual lacunae, and more. Sometimes we even 
engage in sophisticated forms of collective action, such as when groups attempt to engineer 
concepts. And, of course, sometimes we engage in deliberate conceptual conflict. 
 
5 I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me to think more carefully about this issue. 
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Another worry concerns the degree to which different ameliorative projects require the 
coordination of different agents. Perhaps in some cases conceptual engineers will be satisfied once 
their preferred ameliorative proposals are understood by sufficiently many other agents, even if 
these agents do not go on to use the relevant concepts in ways urged by the ameliorative proposals. 
Such endeavors would mostly do away with ameliorative projects (understood as concrete efforts 
to bring about actual conceptual change), thereby rendering unnecessary the need for coordination 
among large groups of agents. If such projects in conceptual engineering exist, rational conceptual 
conflict doesn’t threaten them.  
 Still, it’s clear that there are many projects in conceptual engineering for which the 
coordination of often large numbers of agents is indeed a requirement. For instance, consider 
Robin Dembroff’s efforts to “engineer a revised concept [of sexual orientation] …in light of 
particular theoretical and socio-political purposes” (Dembroff, 2016: 2). For another, consider 
Sally Haslanger’s accounts of race and gender, crafted with the intent to be “effective tools in the 
fight against injustice” (Haslanger, 2000: 36).6 These sort of ameliorative projects, explicitly 
undertaken with ambitious political aims in mind, will not be successful without the coordination 
of potentially exceptionally large numbers of agents. 
More obviously, consider efforts to engineer a concept such as MARRIAGE such that it 
becomes more inclusive and less discriminatory by permitting marriage between same-sex couples 
(Ludlow, 2016: 22-3; Pollock, 2019).7 For such an ameliorative project to succeed, the 
coordination (and indeed deliberate cooperation) of many agents is a requirement, especially 
 
6 See also Kate Manne’s ameliorative account of misogyny (Manne, 2018: 55-77).  
7 When discussing concepts, I use caps. When discussing word-meanings, I use single quotation marks. So, one can 
attempt to engineer the concept of MARRIAGE, but one can also attempt to change the meaning of the word ‘marriage’. 
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agents in institutional settings with the power to shape legislative language. At least some projects 
in conceptual engineering, then, require the coordination of many different agents.  
Lastly, one might be skeptical of the claim that rational conceptual conflict presents a 
serious problem, even if many ameliorative projects require the coordination of large numbers of 
agents. First, one might think that conceptual conflict is not incentivized in sufficiently many 
contexts for it to constitute a pressing practical problem for conceptual engineering. However, 
such skepticism is implausible. In fact, the sort of incentives which drive conceptual conflict are 
quite common. As we’ll see in the following section, there are at least three kinds of incentives 
that drive such conflict: material incentives, social incentives, and moral incentives. Moral 
incentives to engage in conceptual conflict, for example, appear whenever conceptual disputes 
involve agents who disagree about related moral issues. Under such conditions, the expectation 
should be that some level of rational conceptual conflict will occur, with the underlying moral 
disagreement driving the conceptual disagreement. Similarly, opportunities to boost one’s social 
status by initiating or sustaining conceptual conflict are commonplace. For instance, everyday 
conceptual disputes regarding important political concepts are often divided along partisan lines.8 
When disputes are divided along partisan lines, social incentives to engage in conceptual conflict 
are present. Since partisanship and political conflict are common, the relevant incentives are also 
common.9 Lastly, there are material incentives to engage in conceptual engineering of important 
legal concepts, for example, whenever there is competition over legal language among interest 
groups. Since these incentives are common, it’s implausible to maintain that rational conceptual 
conflict is rare. 
 
8 For instance, see Smith (2020) for discussion of how Americans who support different political parties have often 
different ideas about which sorts of policies are socialist.  
9 The nature of these social incentives will be explored in greater detail in section 2.2. 
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Second, one might grant that rational conceptual conflict is not a rare phenomenon while 
still maintaining that a large class of ameliorative projects remain feasible. Not all ameliorative 
projects require coordination among burdensome numbers of agents. Some conceptual engineers 
may have more modest ambitions, content to secure conceptual coordination in conversational 
settings with low numbers of participants (Pinder, 2019; Jorem, forthcoming). To the extent that 
these more modest projects are insulated from incentives that drive conflict, some projects in 
conceptual engineering are not subject to the problem outlined in this paper. 
Conceptual engineers stressing the importance of these sorts of projects are correct to note 
that they are simpler than more ambitious, large-scale projects. Intuitively, the lower numbers 
involved renders implementation more easily achievable. Moreover, there is some empirical 
evidence that novel conceptual coordination in conversations is relatively easy to achieve in certain 
conditions (Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod & Doherty, 1994; Brennan & Clark, 1996; Garrod 
& Pickering, 2004). We should, however, avoid generalizing too much from these studies. 
Conceptual coordination is often actively incentivized in these studies by furnishing participants 
with a common purpose – for instance, the joint navigation of a maze (Garrod & Anderson, 1987; 
Garrod & Doherty, 1994). Additionally, participants in these studies do not stand to gain by 
defecting from coordination. However, in some settings in which ameliorative projects are 
undertaken, coordination will be disincentivized and conflict incentivized. This is true even of 
modest ameliorative projects involving low numbers of agents. With the relevant incentives in 
place, we shouldn’t underestimate the difficulties of securing conceptual alignment even in those 
ameliorative projects that are putatively the simplest to achieve success in. I conclude, then, that 




2. Case Studies in Rational Conceptual Conflict 
Conceptual conflict is bred by a wide variety of incentives in many different contexts. In this 
section I discuss several examples of rational conceptual conflict, focusing on cases driven by 
material incentives, social incentives, and moral incentives. 
 
2.1. Material Incentives 
Sometimes the downstream effects of competing ameliorative proposals are such that, given agents 
with competing beliefs and preferences, material incentives to engage in conceptual conflict 
emerge. This is most obvious in cases of institutionalized conceptual engineering – that is, 
conceptual engineering as it occurs in legal and political institutions (Cappelen, 2018: 36). 
Consider recent disputes over the legal definition of ‘burger’, ‘hot dog’, and other related 
expressions.10 Legislators in Mississippi recently passed a law which precludes manufacturers of 
plant-based products from using expressions like ‘veggie burger’ or ‘vegan hot dog’. Instead, 
expressions like ‘burger’ and ‘hot dog’ are to be reserved for products derived directly from 
livestock. The legislation has been justified on the grounds that it serves to prevent consumer 
confusion. However, members of various plant-based industries claim that this justification is 
spurious. The real purpose of the law, they claim, is to protect traditional farming industries from 
competition. 
 Similar disputes have arisen over the legal definition of ‘milk’. Scott Gottlieb, former 
commissioner of the US Food and Drug Administration, has advocated restricting usage of the 
expression ‘milk’ to traditional dairy milk, banning its application to various plant-based products 
derived from oats, soy, almonds, and more (Gibson, 2018). Again, while the nominal justification 
 
10 See Piper (2019) for relevant discussion. 
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of such a ban is consumer protection, members of the relevant plant-based industries view this as 
an instance of attempted regulatory capture. As they see it, members of the meat industry have 
effectively co-opted the regulatory process to further their pecuniary interests. 
These are cases where the downstream effects of adopting a given ameliorative proposal 
are such that one group will benefit greatly while another bears some costs. Members of traditional 
agribusiness industries stand to benefit financially if competitors are prevented from marketing 
their products in ways that maximize their appeal. Correlatively, members of plant-based 
industries stand to lose from the downstream effects of implementing the relevant ameliorative 
proposals. The differential expected benefits and expected costs incentivize both groups to engage 
in conflict over the relevant legal language. To maximize their chances of winning the conflict, 
each group is further incentivized to adopt various strategies to successfully implement their 
preferred proposal. In legal cases such as this, such strategies might involve establishing a channel 
of communication with (and influence over) appropriate legislative bodies. Without such 
influence, it’s unclear how their preferred proposals would be implemented.  
However, conflict in institutionalized conceptual engineering is not always undertaken 
with the pursuit of wealth in mind. More insidious material incentives are often present. Consider 
disputes over the legal definition of ‘torture’ (Skolnick, 2004; Posner, 2004; Griffin, 2010). Legal 
prohibitions against torture prevent authorities from using methods of interrogation like 
waterboarding against either domestic citizens or foreign nationals. But the legal definition of 
‘torture’ is malleable. Those seeking to deploy currently prohibited methods of interrogation are 
incentivized to bend active definitions to their purposes. With the appropriate definition of ‘torture’ 
in place, practices such as waterboarding become legally available to those willing and able to 
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deploy them. The more effective social control afforded by such practices offer powerful material 
incentives (Coyne and Harris, 2018: Ch. 7).  
Notably, though, we should expect attempts to widen the legal definition of ‘torture’ to be 
vociferously opposed by various groups. Perhaps such groups do not want greater amounts of 
power (in the form of more effective methods of social control) to become available to agents of 
the state. Perhaps such groups oppose the proposed changes on distinctively moral grounds.11 
Those who seek to capture legal language to increase their power often possess very different 
motivations from those who oppose them. Regardless, conflict between such groups is rational, 
driven by conflicting attitudes towards the downstream effects of implementing a given 
ameliorative proposal. 
Cases of conceptual conflict driven by material incentives need not occur in formal, 
institutionalized settings. Consider an interest group that advocates a controversial set of 
institutional reforms – the replacement of elections as mechanisms for selecting political 
representatives with lotteries, for example (Guerrero, 2014). Such an interest group may choose to 
market their proposals as democratic, even if extant conceptions of democracy generally tie 
democracy to the use of regular, free, and fair elections. In effect, the interest group attempts to 
broaden the concept of DEMOCRACY in order to exploit its positive connotations (Pincione & 
Tesón, 2006: 44-5).12 Predictably, however, interest groups with opposing agendas will attempt to 
prevent the concept of democracy from becoming widened. One might even imagine political 
representatives with a vested interest in maintaining the electoral system opposing the relevant 
 
11 Potential conflict between material and moral incentives is explored further in Section 2.3.  
12 To be clear, proponents of sortition can rightly claim that historical accounts of democracy recognized lotteries as 
legitimately democratic selection mechanisms. The point, though, is that contemporary accounts often ignore this 
historical pedigree, and, at some point, popular concepts of democracy shifted towards including the use of elections 
as a necessary condition of any democracy. Accordingly, proposals to widen the concept to once more recognize the 
democratic legitimacy of lotteries are rightly views as ameliorative proposals. 
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ameliorative proposal. These representatives, in an effort to maintain their political position, 
together with all the privileges it accords them, possess powerful material incentives to engage in 
conceptual conflict. 
 
2.2. Social Incentives 
The above cases mostly take place in institutional settings and are driven by the prospect of 
material gain. As the last case demonstrates, though, rational conceptual conflict can occur outside 
of legislative contexts. Departing even further from such cases, incentives to engage in conceptual 
conflict are not always straightforwardly material. Much quotidian communication reveals a 
pattern of reward-seeking behavior wherein agents seek social benefits such as esteem, praise, and 
increased social status.13 Notably, such behavior frequently involves the deliberate initiation of 
conceptual conflict. Through the initiation of conceptual conflict, agents can signal to others in 
ways that secure social benefits, impose social costs on ideologically opposed peers, or both. 
Why might this happen? Consider first a phenomenon like grandstanding. Grandstanding 
utterances are contributed to some public discussion with the aim of persuading others that the 
speaker is morally impressive in some respect (Tosi and Warmke, 2020: 15). For example, 
consider a group of people discussing the relative merits of various gun control policies. A 
consensus emerges, with the group favoring tighter restrictions. After much discussion, a 
previously quiet participant announces:  
 
 
13 The fact that social pressures often lead us to modify our communicative behavior has long been recognized. See 
Goffman (1967) for a classic account. 
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(1) I just want to be clear that I fully support everything that has been said so far, and that 
I have always opposed lax gun control.14 
 
In some cases, such an utterance is intended to signal to one’s peers acceptance of the group’s 
overall views on gun control. It is thus a way to maintain one’s status within one’s social group. 
Of course, such utterances can sometimes be sincere, non-status-seeking attempts to clarify the 
content of one’s beliefs relative to the content of one’s peers’ beliefs. It can often be useful to make 
explicit one’s considered views during heated political discussions. Still, in many cases such 
utterances are purely grandstanding.  
Much like it incentivizes grandstanding, social esteem incentivizes agents to deliberately 
initiate conceptual conflict. In some cases, taking a stand on one side of a conceptual dispute 
signals one’s affiliation with a position, ideology, cause, and so on (Davies, forthcoming: 10-11).15 
Not ceding any conceptual ground to one’s ideological opponents can act as a signal to others 
regarding the sincerity of one’s beliefs, enhancing the credibility and esteem of the speaker. 
 Consider the following sort of public exchange, perhaps in an online forum, which I take 
to be representative of large swathes of political discourse. Suppose Jack utters: 
 
(1) I’m a socialist. I want to implement policies like those found in Scandinavian countries. 
 
Suppose further that Jill responds with: 
 
 
14 See Tosi and Warmke (2016: 204) for a similar example. 
15 Note, though, that not all forms of the sort of identity display Davies investigates involve grandstanding. See Davies 
(forthcoming) for further discussion. 
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(2) Scandinavian countries are not socialist. They are just market economies with some 
redistribution of wealth. 
 
Let’s say that Jack and Jill agree on all the basic facts about the structure and function of the 
relevant political and economic institutions, facts about the sorts of policies regularly implemented 
in Scandinavian countries, and the like. If there is a disagreement here, it seemingly concerns the 
concepts possessed by both, with each possessing a different concept of SOCIALISM. At this point, 
one might expect fully cooperative speakers to note the putative conceptual mismatch. Cooperative 
speakers might handle this mismatch by accommodating the other’s usage of their preferred 
concept, or by agreeing to state their disagreement without reference to the contested concept 
(Chalmers, 2011). Sometimes, though, declining to cooperate yields social benefits for certain 
agents. In such cases, the prospect of social reward comes into tension with any tacit commitment 
to cooperative communication.  
The conversation continues with Jack saying that: 
 
(3) That’s all I mean by ‘socialist’. 
 
Jill, though, spotting the opportunity to grandstand, simply replies with: 
 




Let’s suppose that Jill utters (4) because she knows it sends the right sort of message to her 
ideologically likeminded peers.16 In this case, then, the opportunity for a serious discussion on the 
respective costs and benefits of alternative institutional arrangements is passed up in favor of what 
I call conceptual grandstanding. Refusing to accommodate Jack’s preferred concept allows Jill to 
signal to her peers her disapproval of the sort of policies Jack endorses. This, in turn, secures or 
boosts Jill’s status within her political in-group. Conversely, acts of conceptual accommodation to 
ideological opponents might be penalized by one’s in-group. If that’s right, reasonable discussions 
with agents who possess opposing viewpoints are actively disincentivized. One might even think 
that the simple act of disrespecting Jack (by tersely dismissing his attempt to clarify which concept 
of socialism he possesses) is itself a benefit for Jill. In a social environment bristling with hostility 
towards one’s political opponents and full of partisan bickering, such acts of hostility are often the 
preferred course of action for deeply partisan agents.17 Conceptual mismatches, affording the 
ability to initiate conceptual conflict, are just one method among many of insulting, mocking, or 
otherwise disrespecting one’s political opponents. 
Unlike our earlier cases of institutionalized conceptual conflict, the goal of conceptual 
grandstanding is not to attain some goods by successfully implementing a given ameliorative 
proposal that will, in expectation, result in desirable downstream consequences. The goal is to 
secure benefits by the mere initiation of conflict itself. The conflict is still a means to an end, but 
the end can be brought about regardless of whether implementation is achieved. Indeed, one can 
easily imagine cases where speakers initiate conceptual conflicts while otherwise believing that 
 
16 Of course, not every utterance like (4) constitutes an attempt to grandstand. In other settings, for instance, such an 
utterance might be used to sincerely express one’s conviction that concepts of socialism requiring central planning are 
in some sense superior. Or perhaps one insists on a certain way of using a concept to avoid having one’s views 
misrepresented. In general, token utterances of the same sentence type can be used to grandstand on some occasions 
of use while used for non-grandstanding purposes on others. 
17 See Mason (2018) for an insightful discussion of how political ideology intersects with issues of identity. 
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the concept one is advocating for is unreasonable, or while simply not caring whether one’s 
concept is a good or useful one to be using. Such cases involve social incentives overriding our 
more considered philosophical judgement.  
It’s natural to focus on settings involving partisanship and contentious political disputes 
when considering social incentives to engage in conceptual conflict. But it’s worth observing that 
similar social incentives are present in other contexts too, including contexts where one might 
otherwise think that agents are less easily swayed by social pressures. Consider, for example, the 
incentives an academic philosopher sometimes faces when deciding what work to submit to 
professional journals. All else being equal, suppose that more exciting, more provocative work 
maximizes one’s chances of securing publications, and that a great number of publications in top 
journals maximizes one’s chances of securing a host of other career-related benefits, ranging from 
the esteem of one’s colleagues to greater job prospects. Such mixed material and social incentives 
might indirectly drive philosophers to, for example, advocate for controversial ameliorative 
proposals that strike the right balance between generating excitement, novelty, and – one would 
hope - plausibility. Alternatively, such incentives may influence some to willingly adopt critical 
stances of existing work where they would otherwise be less bullish. Staking out a controversial 
position against well-established figures can be an effective way to secure professional and social 
rewards. In turn, these controversial and exciting positions can themselves become the focus of 
prospective publications, with other academics pursuing the same sorts of professional and social 
benefits. By such means might conceptual disputes among professional philosophers be both 
created and sustained.18 
 
 
18 I return to this point in the final section, as well as addressing some complications regarding the potential benefits 
of conflict in academic research. 
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2.3. Moral Incentives 
Before moving on to consider some important methodological implications of rational conceptual 
conflict, one further set of incentives to engage in conceptual conflict – moral incentives – warrants 
discussion. While some agents engage in conceptual conflict to secure material or social benefits, 
others engage in it because they think it is the right thing to do. For instance, they may see what 
they think of as other agents engineering (or attempting to engineer) concepts in morally incorrect 
ways and, in order to prevent the implementation of morally incorrect ameliorative proposals, they 
engage in conceptual conflict. More generally, they might identify existing perceived conceptual 
injustices, engaging in conflict in an attempt to rectify them. 
Consider, again, our earlier discussion of torture. We saw that some agents might be 
incentivized to capture the relevant law to engineer the concept in such a way that waterboarding 
does not, for legal purposes, constitute torture. Such agents possess material incentives of a sort; 
they are motivated by the acquisition of power and tools of social control. Their opponents, 
however, may be opposed simply because they think waterboarding is immoral. Nobody ought to 
waterboard anybody, and so waterboarding should not be legal.19 Such agents possess obvious 
moral incentives to engage in conceptual conflict with those who wish to engineer the concept of 
TORTURE such that waterboarding is not torture. Additionally, consider the activities of 
conceptual engineers themselves. Those who are motivated by a desire to right what they view as 
existing conceptual injustices are clearly driven by moral incentives of a sort. When conflict is 
necessary to achieve their aims, conceptual engineers are often the ones who deliberately initiate 
conceptual conflict. Indeed, those with whom they quarrel may often be other conceptual 
 
19 Of course, not everything that is immoral is – or should be – illegal. Accordingly, from the fact that something is 
immoral one cannot conclude that something ought to be illegal. People opposed to the legality of waterboarding 
would therefore need additional support for their stance, though one can imagine that such support is easy to attain. 
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engineers, similarly driven by their own sincere underlying moral commitments. In these cases, 
conflict is both a means to securing to implementation and an obstacle to securing implementation. 
The effects of moral incentives on conceptual disputes are more widely recognized than 
those of material or social incentives. Nonetheless, certain facts about these incentives should be 
borne in mind by putative conceptual engineers. First, very many conceptual disputes intersect 
with precisely the sort of substantive moral issues that drive conceptual conflict. Consider disputes 
about concepts such as PERSON, MARRIAGE, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, RACE, GENDER, 
DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM, JUSTICE, and more. In order to secure one’s preferred ameliorative 
proposal regarding any one of these concepts, one will likely encounter sustained and vigorous 
opposition from agents with opposing values.  
Second, high-stakes ameliorative proposals involving important social and political 
concepts are more likely to involve pervasive moral disagreement than low-stakes ameliorative 
proposals involving less important concepts. Indeed, efforts to engineer various social and political 
concepts are often seen as important because they are driven by our underlying values. But this 
suggests that conceptual engineering will increase in difficulty as it becomes more important, in 
part because the likelihood that we encounter resistance from agents with opposing moral 
incentives increases.  
Lastly, it would be premature to assume that the difficulties created by misaligned moral 
incentives could be avoided by appealing to putatively objective moral facts which, in some sense, 
settle the relevant disputes.20 Setting aside obvious controversies regarding the existence of 
objective moral facts, even if such facts exist, they may not help avoid conceptual conflict 
whatsoever. It could very well be the case that, for any given conceptual dispute, one side is 
 
20 C.f. Plunkett’s remarks on the connection between disputes in conceptual ethics and the existence of objective 
normative facts (Plunkett, 2015: 860-1). 
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objectively correct about the extent to which their preferred ameliorative proposal aligns with 
objective moral facts. It could even be the case that one side of a dispute is behaving in an 
obviously epistemically and morally irresponsible fashion. Still, that is true of any dispute, and 
disputes persist nonetheless. Moral disagreement, even if utterly misguided, is enough to create 
and sustain conceptual conflict.  
In addition to material and social incentives, then, moral incentives constitute an important 
source of conceptual conflict. Widespread moral disagreement impedes the implementation of 
ameliorative proposals. Moral disagreement, along with other sources of conceptual conflict, 
presents an interesting and important practical problem for conceptual engineers. 
 
3. Methodological Implications of Rational Conceptual Conflict 
We’ve seen that rational conceptual conflict occurs in many different contexts, driven by a wide 
variety of incentives. Such conflict raises serious difficulties for many important projects in 
conceptual engineering. Naturally, this has important methodological consequences for conceptual 
engineers, both negative and positive. Let’s examine each in turn.  
Negatively, the difficulties created by rational conceptual conflict will in certain cases 
militate entirely against embarking on ameliorative projects. First, in some cases conflict will 
constitute such a serious obstacle that it effectively renders the successful implementation of an 
ameliorative proposal impossible. If so, then it’s plausible to suppose that conceptual engineers 
shouldn’t waste their time with such futile endeavors, especially in cases where the conflict has its 
own costs. 
 Consider again our earlier example involving attempts to engineer the concept of 
DEMOCRACY such that the use of lotteries to select political representatives counts as legitimately 
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democratic. Suppose that proponents of lotteries face considerable levels of opposition. Competing 
interest groups, as well as the overwhelming majority of the general public, find their proposals 
unintuitive and implausible. Worse still, their ameliorative proposals garner significant backlash, 
seen by many as attempts to delegitimize and destabilize valuable democratic institutions. 
Proponents of these proposals are vilified, eventually bearing many costs, both personal and 
professional. If, due to widespread opposition, implementation of the relevant ameliorative 
proposal is impossible, and if, due to the vilification they receive, proponents of lotteries bear steep 
costs and comparatively few (if any) benefits, it seems that they should, prudentially speaking, 
avoid attempting to implement their proposals entirely. Their time and energy are better put 
towards alternative ends. 
 With that said, at least two important caveats should be noted. On the one hand, in some 
cases there may be good reason to attempt to implement one’s preferred proposal even if one 
knows that one’s likelihood of success is nil. Perhaps some good can come of the attempt itself, 
even if one’s ultimate aims are frustrated. For instance, imagine that proponents of lotteries are 
content to spread awareness of their proposals, even though they’re aware of their dim prospects 
for success. As things stand, they will not succeed, but their efforts today lay the groundwork for 
future proponents who may fare better. On the other hand, in cases where those who deliberately 
impede our ameliorative projects act unjustly, it might be intrinsically good to resist their 
injustices, even if our likelihood of success is nil and even if no downstream instrumental benefits 
arise from the attempt itself. Recall the earlier suggestion that elected representatives with a vested 
interest in maintaining the status quo would oppose such ameliorative reforms. Suppose that these 
representatives have good reason to believe that the relevant ameliorative proposals offer an all-
things-considered better concept of DEMOCRACY. Suppose further that the sort of institutional 
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reforms proponents of lotteries endorse would greatly improve on existing institutions, improving 
the lives of virtually everybody. Nonetheless, representatives block the proposed reforms, both 
conceptual and institutional, in order to maintain their privileged position. If so, their recalcitrance 
is unjust. In such a case, conceptual engineers, doomed to failure due to the unjust actions of others, 
may have reason to attempt implementation regardless. If nothing else, such behavior is a symbolic 
act of resistance. 
 Second, the expected costs of the conflict may simply outweigh the aggregate expected 
benefits of both implementing the relevant proposal and any subsidiary benefits that arise from 
merely attempting to implement it, even if those benefits are non-zero. For example, if the expected 
benefits of implementation are both relatively low and improbable, while the expected costs of 
conflict are both relatively high and likely to occur, this suggests that conceptual engineers should 
refrain from the attempt altogether. To continue the preceding example, suppose that the benefits 
of engineering the concept DEMOCRACY such that lotteries are genuinely democratic selection 
mechanisms are slight – proponents of this proposal, as well as ordinary citizens unconcerned with 
such matters, would not gain very much, if anything. Suppose moreover that there is a considerable 
degree of uncertainty whether the ameliorative proposal in question can even be feasibly 
implemented.21 If, in contrast, the putative conceptual engineers could confidently predict 
significant amounts of very costly conflict, this suggests that they should refrain from the attempt 
entirely (bearing in mind, naturally, the two caveats outlined previously).  
 Of course, the costs of conflict will not always be high enough to militate against 
attempting to engineer concepts. In cases where the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs, 
 
21 Of course, the very same points might apply to the associated institutional proposals themselves; that is, the benefits 
of transitioning from electoral democracy to the use of lotteries as selection mechanisms may be slight (if there are 
any at all), and the reforms may not be feasibly implementable. On the former point, see Landa and Pevnick (2021).  
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it is rational for putative engineers to pursue their ends, even in cases where the probability of 
success is low.22 Such a case would arise if, for example, the probability of successfully 
engineering the concept DEMOCRACY was low, but the expected benefits from implementation 
were sufficiently great. Still, conceptual engineers should factor expected costs of conflict into 
their decisions about whether to pursue ameliorative projects. On occasion, these costs will be 
great enough to count against such pursuits entirely. 
However, in addition to some negative implications, there are positive upshots to the 
recognition that conceptual conflict is driven by incentives. First, a simple but important point: by 
knowing in advance the sort of contexts within which conceptual conflict is incentivized, 
conceptual engineers can more sagaciously choose which ameliorative projects to focus their 
efforts on. All else being equal, those projects which will predictably face protracted bouts of 
active resistance or sabotage from rational agents pursuing their own ends are less preferable to 
cases where conflict is either less likely or, even if likely, less likely to constitute a serious barrier 
to implementation. Consequently, conceptual engineers should, if possible, avoid attempting to 
implement ameliorative proposals in settings where incentives to engage in conceptual conflict are 
present. If this is too difficult, then settings where the relevant incentives are relatively weak are 
worth considering. After all, effectively disseminating a novel ameliorative proposal, overcoming 
comprehension deficits, and aligning the behavior of large numbers of agents are already difficult 
tasks. The presence of conflict merely compounds such difficulties.  
Naturally, though, all else is not always equal, and the expected benefits of implementation 
are once more relevant. Roughly speaking, ameliorative projects with high expected benefits may 
be worth pursuing even if implementation must be attempted in contexts characteristically beset 
 
22 See Andow (forthcoming) for insightful discussion of the relevant issues. 
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by conflict. Nonetheless, the presence of likely conflict might act as a tiebreaker in cases where 
different course of action would yield approximately the same expected benefits, with higher 
expected costs of conflict counting against proposals where conflict is expected to arise. More 
generally, the expected costs of conflict will be relevant when conceptual engineers are deciding 
between ameliorative projects with different quantities of expected benefits. Even if one proposal 
offers lower benefits than another, it might still be worth pursuing if it is significantly easier to 
implement as a result of encountering less resistance.23 In short, an accurate assessment of the 
potential costs of encountering rational conceptual conflict will help conceptual engineers to make 
better decisions about which ameliorative projects are worth pursuing; and to make these more 
accurate assessments, knowledge of the conditions under which conceptual conflict is incentivized 
is crucial. 
In this vein, it might be helpful for conceptual engineers to empirically investigate such 
matters. Perhaps certain types of concepts are subject to more conflict than others. For instance, 
perhaps efforts to engineer socio-political concepts will encounter more conflict than efforts to 
engineer scientific concepts. Perhaps certain strategies to secure implementation have a better 
track record than others. We could examine various attempts to, say, secure implementation for 
novel ameliorative proposals in institutional settings in order to determine which methods 
deployed by the relevant conceptual engineers are more effective. Perhaps, for instance, strategies 
that seek incremental adjustments of existing concepts are typically more successful than those 
seeking significant conceptual revision or conceptual abandonment.  
Let’s now consider a second positive implication, the importance of which is neglected: 
recognizing the fact that incentives play a crucial role in driving conceptual conflict will allow 
 
23 Indeed, this point generalizes. All else being equal, ameliorative proposals that face fewer practical impediments of 
any kind are preferable to those facing more practical impediments. 
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conceptual engineers to develop more effective strategies for implementing their ameliorative 
proposals. As we’ve seen, the background context within which ameliorative projects are pursued 
is important. In some settings, incentives to engage in conceptual conflict will be common and 
powerful; in others, coordination and cooperation will be incentivized. Crucially, though, we can 
deliberately alter the background context in order to modify the payoffs and penalties associated 
with cooperative behavior. In a slogan: engineer the social environment to better engineer the 
concepts.  
Indirect strategies that attempt to modify existing incentives may be more effective than 
direct strategies that ignore underlying incentives, holding fixed the background context, while 
attempting to influence agents within that context. Consider first a direct strategy. In recent work, 
Rachel Sterken suggests that a particular sort of linguistic intervention can disrupt established 
patterns of concept use in such a way that concept users become more amenable to accepting novel 
ameliorative proposals (Sterken, 2020).24 Sterken calls successful interventions in this vein 
transformative communicative disruptions – so called because they prompt a transformation on 
the part of the target agent’s understanding of the relevant concept (Ibid, 430). 
How might these linguistic interventions work? Suppose an agent wants to engineer a 
concept by implementing a given ameliorative proposal. Let’s suppose the concept is PERSON, 
and that the proposal in question would classify as persons all sorts of non-human animals, 
including regular household pets, animals traditionally kept as livestock, and more. One way for 
the putative conceptual engineer to proceed is to use the concept as if it already had the meaning 
it would have post-amelioration, and to interpret other concept users as if they are using the concept 
in ways that align with the ameliorative proposal in question. For instance, if asked about the 
 
24 See also Cantalamessa (2019) for relevant discussion. 
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kindest person they know, they could mention their pet gerbil. The rationale behind such a 
communicative act is to prompt reflection on the target concept in one’s audience. If the agent 
attempting the intervention is typically serious, or is known to hold strongly anti-speciesist views, 
the target might begin to wonder what the agent is trying to communicate. Perhaps with subsequent 
reflection comes acknowledgement of the various defects our concept of PERSON possesses (if it 
is indeed defective); and perhaps with such acknowledgement comes amenability to adopting 
ameliorative proposals designed to remedy those defects. 
However, claims about the purported benefits of disruptive linguistic interventions rest 
upon some contentious empirical assumptions. On the one hand, it’s unclear whether disrupting 
standard communicative patterns by using concepts in highly non-standard ways will cause one’s 
intended audience to engage in the sort of reflection the process needs. Disruptive, uncooperative 
communication may simply lead to confusion, frustration, or even annoyance (Garfinkel, 1967: 
42).25 On the other hand, even if reflection is prompted, people who attempt these sorts of linguistic 
interventions also need to navigate a social environment in part constituted by agents with 
competing beliefs, preferences, and – very often – misaligned incentives. Importantly, however, 
linguistic interventions by themselves do not shift the background incentives in such a way that 
conflict becomes disincentivized.  
In cases like the above, other agents may oppose the relevant ameliorative proposal on 
moral grounds, perhaps because they believe that most (or even all) non-humans cannot be 
persons. Alternatively, if the attempted intervention occurs in a context that affords grandstanding, 
the process can be derailed by agents who seek to benefit socially from publicly airing their 
 
25 See Stokoe (2018: 44-5) for further discussion. 
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opposing views.26 Failure of linguistic intervention can also occur in cases with alignment of 
preferences but misalignment of beliefs. The audience might agree that the relevant concept ought 
to be ameliorated while also thinking that linguistic interventions are too unreliable to effectively 
secure implementation. If such agents believe that more effective means are available, they may 
intentionally decline to coordinate with the speaker attempting the linguistic intervention. In short, 
both conflicting values and conflicting beliefs about the appropriate way to secure implementation 
for ameliorative proposals can incentivize rational conceptual conflict, even when linguistic 
interventions are attempted. 
Of course, I do not claim that linguistic interventions can never succeed; nor do I claim 
that direct strategies more generally will always fail. With that said, we should be realistic about 
the difficulties direct strategies will face in environments where misaligned incentives pull agents 
in opposing directions.27 At the very least, it is advisable to pursue direct strategies in tandem with 
indirect strategies that attempt to modify background incentives. 
Let’s now consider an indirect strategy. Recall the possibility that protracted bouts of 
conceptual conflict might be incentivized within academic philosophy because more controversial 
and more combative manuscripts with bold ameliorative proposals are more likely to be published, 
more likely to gain the esteem of one’s peers, and more likely to gain their author professional 
notoriety than less controversial and more conciliatory manuscripts displaying a higher willingness 
to attempt conceptual rapprochement.28 Making headway on longstanding conceptual disputes 
 
26 Admittedly, there may also be cases where the opportunity to grandstand is most naturally expressed by publicly 
accepting the novel ameliorative proposal.  
27 Koch (2018) argues that we can exert a certain degree of long-range collective control over our concepts. For 
reasons that should be clear, though, I think this claim is overly optimistic. Rational conceptual conflict will, in most 
cases, render such control extremely difficult to maintain (even setting aside the difficulties of coordinating large 
numbers of non-conflicting agents separated from each other in space and time, as well as other practical worries). 
28 This likely oversimplifies the landscape of incentives facing academic philosophers seeking to publish in reputable 
journals. It’s possible that the range of acceptable views is constrained by an academic Overton window of sorts, and 
that controversial and combative views falling outside this window do not deliver professional benefits to those 
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might require a greater willingness to engage in collaborative work, where philosophers who are 
otherwise sharply opposed to one another can set aside their differences and attempt to 
compromise on mutually acceptable ameliorative proposals. If so, then we should strive to 
cultivate professional institutional settings where such cooperative enterprise is rewarded as much 
as more antagonistic work. 
To achieve this, there are several things academic philosophers could do. For example, 
journals could devote special issues to the (potential) resolution of persistent conceptual disputes 
that arise among philosophers, whether historically speaking or among contemporary 
philosophers. Similarly, conferences could revolve around themes related to conceptual 
collaboration, the reconciliation of seemingly opposing views, and so on. The idea here is 
relatively straightforward: conference presentations, publications, and their downstream benefits 
(disciplinary esteem, citations, tenure, and so on) are the rewards philosophers pursue, and given 
existing incentives, they frequently pursue them with bold, controversial work that perpetuates 
existing conflicts. But if the very same rewards could be achieved by work that attempts to resolve 
conflict, then we could incentivize greater levels of (conceptual) collaboration.  
With that said, I am not claiming that we should eliminate conceptual conflict entirely. 
Valuable research can be produced by people intentionally staking out a controversial position 
against salient academics. Sometimes conflict will be necessary to change concepts in desirable 
ways. More generally, a certain amount of conflict can be a good thing for reliable group inquiry 
(Zollman, 2010; Peters, 2020).29 Nevertheless, it may be that we fail to strike the right balance 
 
academics willing to attempt to publish them. This, though, is consistent with bolder and more controversial work 
within this window being more easily published than more collaborative but less striking work. If so, the incentives 
still push philosophers to engage in conceptual conflict more than they would otherwise, even if by less than we 
initially assumed. 
29 See also Davies (2013) for related discussion. 
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between incentivizing bold, original, occasionally combative work and incentivizing more 
cooperative work. At the very least, we could experiment with different indirect strategies, each 
shifting background incentives in different directions and to different degrees, in order to 
determine which enables the optimal balance between combativeness and collaboration. 
Outside of the narrow confines of academic philosophy, feasible incentive alignment 
strategies will be harder to come by. Much conceptual engineering is attempted not within 
cloistered academic environments, but within the broader political community. Attempting to align 
the material, social, and moral incentives of this much wider class of agents is as ambitious as the 
very ameliorative projects indirect strategies seek to better enable, if not more ambitious. Still, like 
conceptual engineering itself, even if it is difficult, it is not impossible. And bearing in mind the 
complications noted above regarding the occasional benefits of conflict, the expected benefits of 
engineering our social environment to better enable fruitful conceptual cooperation may be high 
enough to render this endeavor worthwhile, even if the probability of success is low. 
As with conceptual engineering itself, the expected costs and expected benefits will vary 
depending on the details. For instance, an attempt to engineer legal and political institutions to 
prevent interest groups from unduly influencing important legal language, even if possible, may 
be far too difficult. Even if it is achievable, preventing interest groups from shaping legal language 
may harm the activities of interest groups who set out to implement worthwhile and beneficial 
ameliorative proposals. Accordingly, this sort of undertaking should not be pursued lightly, as the 
expected costs may easily outweigh the expected benefits. Less ambitious endeavors, such as 
aligning the incentives of academic philosophers, are much less costly to pursue, while also 
offering the possibility of moving past stubborn philosophical disputes that resist resolution. At 
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Conceptual engineers must attend to the obstacles they are likely to encounter when attempting to 
implement their preferred ameliorative proposals. Among these obstacles are the activities of 
agents who are incentivized to oppose their ameliorative projects, whether in pursuit of material 
goods, in the hopes of boosting their social status, or because they are driven by substantive 
underlying moral commitments. Though this sort of conflict doesn’t render successful conceptual 
engineering impossible, it is indeed a serious problem – the incentives that drive such conflict are 
common, they can harm the prospects of even relatively modest ameliorative projects, and 
practical measures to make ameliorative proposals easier to implement will likely fail if they 
ignore the underlying incentive structure which drives conflict in the first place. One pessimistic 
upshot of this paper is that the practical impediments created by rational conceptual conflict will 
sometimes be so severe that conceptual engineers should abandon their ameliorative proposals 
altogether. 
 At the same time, understanding that rational conceptual conflict is bred by incentives, 
together with knowing what those incentives are and in what contexts they commonly arise, can 
help conceptual engineers make better decisions about which ameliorative proposals to focus their 
efforts on. By knowing in advance the likely difficulties of pursuing projects in contexts where 
conceptual conflict is common, conceptual engineers can factor these costs into their decisions 
about which proposals to pursue. More ambitiously, conceptual engineers can begin to think about 
the possibility of engineering their social environment to better enable fruitful conceptual 
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cooperation. By modifying the incentive structure in contexts where conflict would typically 
otherwise constitute a serious problem, conceptual engineers can make it easier for themselves to 
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